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PATHS OF RESISTANCE TO OUR IMPERIAL
FIRST AMENDMENT
Bertrall L. Ross II*
Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Consti-
tution. By Robert C. Post. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London:
Harvard University Press. 2014. Pp. viii, 165. $29.95.
Introduction
In the campaign finance realm, we are in the age of the imperial First
Amendment.1 Over the past nine years, litigants bringing First Amendment
claims against campaign finance regulations have prevailed in every case in
the Supreme Court.2 A conservative core of five justices has developed virtu-
ally categorical protections for campaign speech and has continued to ex-
pand those protections into domains that states once had the authority to
regulate. As the First Amendment’s empire expands, other values give way.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. For
their helpful suggestions for improvement, I would like to thank Roxanna Altholz, Andrew
Bradt, Catherine Crump, Saira Mohamed, Andrea Roth, and Rachel Stern. I would also like to
express my greatest appreciation to Joy Milligan for talking through the ideas with me and
reviewing multiple drafts.
1. Paul Carrington was the first scholar to refer to the First Amendment in imperial
terms. See Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1167
(2001). While Carrington criticized the Supreme Court’s expansion of First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial advertising, id. at 1188–92, my focus is on the Court’s expansion of
virtually categorical First Amendment protection to more forms of campaign finance. “Impe-
rial” as used here refers to the current Supreme Court’s tendency to expand the reach of First
Amendment protection to speech previously subject to governmental regulation.
2. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (striking down the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act’s aggregate limits on campaign contributions to candidates); Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (striking down a Mon-
tana statute banning independent expenditures by corporations “in connection with a candi-
date or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party”
(quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (invalidat-
ing Arizona campaign finance law providing matching funds for publicly funded candidates
facing privately funded opposition); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–41, 365 (2010)
(striking down the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act bar on independent corporate
expenditures for electioneering communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 743–44 (2008)
(striking down the “Millionaires’ Amendment” to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which
relaxed fundraising limits for opponents of self-financed candidates); FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (striking down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
prohibition on electioneering communications as applied to the respondent’s campaign adver-
tisements); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s campaign-
917
918 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:917
Four key cases from this era illustrate the reach of this imperial First
Amendment. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, the Court held that the
state could regulate only the most obvious forms of express advocacy for a
candidate, thus expanding the space in which First Amendment rights cate-
gorically trump other state interests.3 In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as individuals
and limited dramatically the state’s capacity to protect the integrity of the
democratic process.4 Only the narrow interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption or the appearance of such corruption could justify independent
corporate expenditure regulations.5 When the state of Montana in American
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock offered evidence of such corruption to sup-
port its regulation of independent corporate expenditures, the Court simply
presumed that the regulation did not in fact protect against this type of
corruption.6 This decision raised the possibility that no state actor would be
able to support a campaign finance restriction with evidence of a compelling
purpose. Finally, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court expanded this First
Amendment regime from campaign expenditures to campaign contribu-
tions, holding that only quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of such
corruption could justify contribution limits.7 The Court then simply con-
cluded as a matter of logic that the regulation did not protect against such
corruption in the face of legislative evidence to the contrary.8
Members of the public, scholars, and dissenting justices have resisted
this First Amendment imperialism. Some criticize the line the Court has
drawn between the electoral domain, where speech can be regulated, and the
political domain, where it cannot.9 These scholars advocate for a broader
contribution limits to candidates as too low). The state has succeeded only in sustaining dis-
closure requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71 (upholding the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act’s disclosure requirement).
3. 551 U.S. at 469–70 (“[A]n ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if
the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”).
4. 558 U.S. at 349–51, 359–60 (rejecting the state interest in preventing distortion and
unfair influence in the political process).
5. Id. at 359.
6. 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (holding, without reasoning in a per curiam opinion, that the
arguments in favor of the Montana campaign finance law “were already rejected in Citizens
United”). But see id. at 2491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Montana’s experience . . . casts grave
doubts on the Court’s supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to
do so.”).
7. 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (“Any regulation must . . . target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’
corruption or its appearance.”).
8. See id. at 1452 (“If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to
$5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible
if given $1,801 . . . .”); id. at 1470 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to legislative evidence that
the regulation would protect against corruption).
9. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 Tex. L.
Rev. 1751, 1778–79 (1999) (arguing for the necessity of drawing a line between the election
and politics spaces and suggesting one that Congress partially adopted when it enacted the
April 2015] Paths of Resistance to Our Imperial First Amendment 919
electoral domain and for applying a different form of First Amendment
scrutiny for speech in this domain.10 Others lament the Court’s narrow con-
ception of the state’s compelling interest in regulating speech. They point to
the widespread public cynicism about politics, a cynicism arising from the
sense that the rich and powerful have unfair political influence through cam-
paign contributions and expenditures, even if they do not bribe candidates
directly.11 The public has also directed anger at the Court’s decision to treat
corporations like people under the First Amendment.12 Many argue for
lesser constitutional protections for corporations because the special legal
protections they receive in the economic marketplace provide them with
unique capacities to amass wealth and to use it to distort the democratic
process.13 But all of this resistance thus far has been futile.14
In his new book, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the
Constitution, Yale Law School Dean Robert Post15 proposes a new path for
resisting the imperial First Amendment. Synthesizing history and doctrine,
Post develops a First Amendment theory and proposes a framework to rec-
oncile First Amendment values with the demands of self-government (pp. 5,
90–94). Post explains that public opinion has emerged as the principal
means by which the people communicate with their representatives in our
system of self-government.16 Speech is the primary input in the ongoing
process of public-opinion formation. When elections produce representa-
tives who are responsive to public opinion, people who can contribute to
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exception-
alism and the First Amendment, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803, 1828 (1999) (suggesting that a doctrinal
line between election-related speech and non–election related speech is just as feasible as any
other doctrinal line the Court has to draw and proposing such a line). But see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 674–75 (1997)
(contending that any effort to draw the line would be impossible because elections are “seam-
lessly connected to the informal political debates that continue in the periods between them”).
10. See, e.g., Schauer & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1805 (“If electoral exceptionalism prevails,
courts evaluating restrictions on speech that is part of the process of nominating and electing
candidates would employ a different standard from what we might characterize as the normal,
or baseline, degree of First Amendment scrutiny.”).
11. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 507 (2007) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (pointing to public opinion polls suggesting “pervasive public cynicism” about the politi-
cal process arising from the effects of money in politics).
12. This is captured in the popular slogan that “corporations are not people.” See gener-
ally Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You Do and What You Can Do About It (2012).
13. This is the basis for the antidistortion argument that served as a compelling justifica-
tion for campaign finance regulations before Citizens United. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 205 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–60 (1990).
14. After McCutcheon, major news media outlets resignedly pronounced that the remain-
ing contribution limits could no longer prevent the “few people with the most money [from
being] the loudest voice in politics.” Editorial, The Court Follows the Money, N.Y. Times, Apr.
3, 2014, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/the-court-follows-
the-money.html.
15. Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
16. See pp. 31–43.
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public-opinion formation through speech experience democratic legitima-
tion (p. 60). The people develop a sense of ownership over their govern-
ment. The First Amendment should therefore protect the right of every
citizen to participate in democratic discourse.
After broadly defining the First Amendment right, Post departs from the
imperialists. The Court has balanced away the state interest in democratic
integrity, which Post reframes as electoral integrity, in favor of the superior
right to freedom of speech (pp. 60–61). Post argues that this approach is
misguided because electoral integrity is an essential precondition to First
Amendment rights. Electoral integrity “presupposes . . . public trust in the
responsiveness of representatives to public opinion” (p. 61). To the extent
that the people do not perceive their representatives to be responsive to pub-
lic opinion, speech as democratic legitimation is undermined. Courts should
therefore evaluate campaign finance laws according to whether the laws pro-
tect against threats to electoral integrity.
In many respects, Post’s theory and framework are quite persuasive. He
fulfills his goal of providing “a constitutional framework of analysis in which
First Amendment doctrine and campaign finance reform can be connected
to each other in a coherent and theoretically satisfactory manner” (p. 5). He
offers a basis for reconciling “our republican tradition . . . with our commit-
ment to discursive democracy” (p. 6). And ultimately, he presents a compel-
ling case for how the Court in Citizens United, which serves as the focal
point of the book, deviated from First Amendment principles. Given that
the liberal justices decided to adopt many of the elements of Post’s theory
and constitutional framework in their McCutcheon dissent, Post’s work
could represent the future of First Amendment doctrine in the campaign
finance realm.17
But Post’s constitutional framework is unlikely to convince the Court’s
current conservative majority. Insofar as Post’s theory of the First Amend-
ment is grounded in history, his stylized and synthetic account is unlikely to
persuade those who demand greater rigor. But perhaps more importantly,
Post’s constitutional framework is flawed because it fails to account for a
linchpin in the Court’s recent campaign finance jurisprudence: the concern
about chilling constitutional speech. A path of resistance to the imperial
First Amendment will need to account for this concern. In this Review, then,
I offer an alternative path forward that builds from Post’s theory and consti-
tutional framework but addresses concerns about chilling speech. This pro-
posal shifts the responsibility for complex fact-based judgments from courts
conducting case-by-case adjudications to agencies issuing advisory
determinations.
This Review proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I explore Post’s historical
survey of self-government and anticipate critiques of this account. In Part II,
I review Post’s proposed First Amendment theory and constitutional frame-
work for adjudicating challenges to campaign finance regulations. In Part
17. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467–68 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Citizens Divided 7–16, 80–94).
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III, I focus on the omission in Post’s constitutional framework—his failure
to address the Court’s concern about chilling constitutional speech. I then
offer another path forward that builds from Post’s framework but accounts
for the Court’s concern about chilling effects.
I. A History of Self-Government
Dean Post’s book is the product of the prestigious Tanner Lectures on
Human Values, which he delivered at Harvard Law School in 2013. In addi-
tion to the lectures, the book includes commentaries from Stanford Law
Professor Pamela Karlan, Harvard Law Professors Lawrence Lessig and Frank
Michelman, Columbia Political Science Professor Nadia Urbinati, and a re-
ply by Post. This Review focuses on the two lectures by Post that form the
core of the book. In the first lecture, “A Short History of Representation and
Discursive Democracy,” Post provides a “quick and stylized survey of the
history of self-government” (p. 6). He relies on this history to develop his
First Amendment theory. In the second lecture, “Campaign Finance Reform
and the First Amendment,” he uses the theory to construct a constitutional
framework for reviewing challenges to campaign finance regulation that rec-
onciles freedom of speech and self-government.
Post begins his historical account at the founding of the American Re-
public. The founders, according to Post, believed that “ ‘representation’ re-
quired a ‘chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom
they have committed the exercise of the powers of government.’ ”18 “The
chain of communication needed to be ‘sufficiently strong and discernible’ to
sustain the popular conviction that representatives spoke for the people
whom they purported to represent.” The chain proves central to what Post
refers to as representative integrity (pp. 8, 15–16). Representative integrity is
a core value of representative government and requires “trust and confi-
dence between representatives and constituents, such that the latter believe
that they are indeed ‘represented’ by the former” (p. 16; footnote omitted).
In the republic’s early days, when the community entitled to participate
in the political process was small and the relationship between representa-
tives and constituents was closer, representative integrity was maintained
through elections (pp. 7–10, 17). When the political community expanded
in the Jacksonian era due to increasing population and a broadening of the
franchise, personal connection with and knowledge of the representative
could no longer sustain trust and confidence between representatives and
constituents (p. 17). In this era, the party system emerged as the principal
tool to maintain the chain of communication between representatives and
constituents (p. 21). Parties supported elected officials who advanced the
party’s ideologies in performing their representative duties, and candidates
who ran on the party’s platform (p. 21). Party affiliations therefore meant
something in terms of what the representative stood for. And ultimately,
18. P. 8 (quoting James Wilson, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States of America 30–31 (1792)).
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“[b]y voting for a party, the electorate could seek to make government re-
sponsive to the principles espoused by the party” (p. 22).
In the decades after the Civil War, the chain of communication between
representatives and constituents, previously maintained through the party
system, began to break down (p. 24). Parties in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century abandoned ideology and principle in favor of gaining and
preserving political power by whatever means (p. 24). Ideological parties
evolved into party machines that did whatever it took to secure more votes
for their preferred candidates (pp. 26–27). As a result, the party label pro-
vided less information to the voters about what representatives stood for and
whether they were responsive to the electorate. As ideological parties de-
clined, powerful and wealthy corporations became increasingly prominent
in the economic marketplace (pp. 26–28). These corporations took advan-
tage of the break in the chain of communication and used their wealth to
influence political parties and politicians to “produce laws that would give
them an economic edge” (pp. 26–28).
The Progressive Era in the early twentieth century arose in part as a
response to this breakdown in representative integrity (p. 28). Legislatures
sought to stem corporations’ capacity to influence politics, enacting laws to
prohibit corporations from contributing to campaigns with money from
their general treasuries. Other changes increased the people’s capacity to
hold representatives directly accountable (pp. 29–30).
The development of these more direct methods for holding representa-
tives accountable would seem to suggest that elections reemerged as the
principal tool for maintaining representative integrity. But Post argues that
in fact it was public opinion that moved to the forefront (pp. 31–43). Repre-
sentative integrity was preserved through “institutional forms in which pub-
lic opinion could directly express itself, without the need of intermediation”
(p. 31). Public opinion replaced political parties as the principal tool for
maintaining a “ ‘chain of communication’ through which the public could
hold candidates accountable” (p. 34). These changes represented a shift from
party democracy to what Post labels discursive democracy (p. 36).
In this discursive democracy, the people participate in the formation of
an “ ‘essentially active’ public opinion that is ‘always in the making.’”19 Pub-
lic opinion “surrounds and envelops government, holding it continuously
but indirectly accountable. [It] is the incessant muffled voice that elected
officials always strain to hear and interpret” (p. 36). The people through
their participation in public-opinion formation and the establishment of
“institutions designed to make government continuously responsive to pub-
lic opinion . . . develop a ‘sense of ownership’ of ‘their’ government” (p. 36).
Post defines as “democratic legitimation” the discursive process by which
people enjoy the benefits of self-government (p. 36). In order for representa-
tive integrity to be secured within discursive democracy, “[a]ll must be enti-
tled to participate ‘in deliberation’ because ‘political decisions are
19. P. 35 (quoting Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (1914)).
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characteristically imposed on all.’”20 The First Amendment opens the chan-
nel for this participation by protecting communicative rights that “define
the processes that produce public opinion as such” (p. 38; emphasis
omitted).
Post then turns to First Amendment doctrine. He points to language in
Supreme Court opinions suggesting that the doctrine has evolved to safe-
guard the demands of discursive democracy and representative integrity (pp.
39–41). The Court, he shows, has repeatedly described “speech concerning
the public affairs [as] the essence of self-government.”21 According to the
Court, the “First Amendment exemplifies a ‘profound national commit-
ment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”22 Through advancing this national commitment,
the Court has said, “the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individ-
ual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican
system of self-government.”23 On the basis of this jurisprudence and the
history of self-government, Post contends, the design of First Amendment
doctrine must be understood “as protect[ing] the processes of democratic
legitimation required for discursive democracy” (p. 41).
Post concludes his first lecture by offering a First Amendment theory
derived from this history of self-government. He explains that the historical
account he offers, if accurate, means that “controversies [about the First
Amendment] should be adjudicated according to the needs of democratic
legitimation” (p. 41). Democratic legitimation requires, at the very least,
that the First Amendment protect the right of every citizen to act as “a po-
tential participant, a potential politician” in democratic discourse.24 Public
opinion is formed in this democratic discourse, and governmental institu-
tions are expected to be responsive to it.
The First Amendment theory that Post articulates in Citizens Divided,
with its focus on discursive democracy and democratic legitimation, is not
entirely new. In fact, Post developed many aspects of this theory in a series
of law review articles that established an esteemed place for him among First
Amendment scholars.25 But what is unique about Post’s First Amendment
theory in Citizens Divided is the means by which he derives it. In his past
work, Post derived his First Amendment theory mostly through interpreting
20. P. 37 (quoting Bernard Manin et al., On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 Pol.
Theory 338, 352 (1987)).
21. P. 40 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22. P. 40 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
23. P. 40 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
24. P. 41 (quoting Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism
and Equality 310 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477
(2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory Democracy]; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Commercial Speech]; Robert
Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249 (1995).
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doctrine and employing logic. He relied on this method of constitutional-
meaning elaboration to argue that a First Amendment theory premised on
the value of self-government better accounts for doctrine than alternative
theories premised on the value of individual autonomy.26 He has also relied
on doctrine as the basis for opposing one of the leading theories of the First
Amendment offered by Alexander Meiklejohn, who suggests that “the value
of democratic self-governance lies in informed democratic decision mak-
ing.”27 Post has argued, by contrast, that the right to be informed is merely a
derivative right that stems from the First Amendment value of self-govern-
ance.28 The core value of self-governance that the First Amendment protects
is the right of speakers to participate in public discourse.29
In Citizens Divided, Post continues to look to doctrine but he also relies
on a historical account of self-government as an additional foundation for
his First Amendment theory. Post may have chosen to focus more on the
history of self-government because First Amendment doctrine has devel-
oped without establishing any clear hierarchy among three fundamental
values: autonomy, democratic self-governance through informed decision-
making, and democratic self-governance through participation in public dis-
course.30 If we understand doctrine as reflecting the constitutional
commitments of the people, as Post does, it appears that the people have not
decided how to prioritize these values.
Post’s choice to focus on external history may also reflect fundamental
shifts in constitutional theory over the past thirty years or so. Both original-
ists and nonoriginalists frequently rely on histories external to doctrine to
support accounts of constitutional meaning. Originalists have increasingly
coalesced around an approach to constitutional-meaning elaboration
that focuses on the public meaning of words or phrases at the time the
26. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 25, at 479–82.
27. Id. at 482–89.
28. Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 25, at 25 (suggesting that the First Amendment
value of “speech merely for the information it conveys” is subordinate to the value of “speech
as a form of participation in public discourse”).
29. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 25, at 489 (“I believe that the First Amend-
ment commitments we have historically inherited plainly place the protection of public dis-
course at the core of the First Amendment . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (describing as “the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment” the
speaker’s “autonomy to choose the content of his own message”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (describing one of the functions of the
First Amendment as protecting “the right to hear or receive information” to advance “the
interchange of ideas”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (describing as a
fundamental principle of the First Amendment “[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
April 2015] Paths of Resistance to Our Imperial First Amendment 925
constitutional provision in question was written.31 By contrast, nonoriginal-
ists, including Post, derive their constitutional understandings from transla-
tions of the convictions of constitutional culture and the demands of social
movements into case law.32 Both approaches to constitutional-meaning elab-
oration, however, demand a rigorous historical examination: by looking at a
specific moment in history, originalists might ask how the public used or
understood a constitutional term or phrase, while nonoriginalists might
probe the convictions of the people or claims of social movements.
As a “quick and stylized survey,” the first lecture was not designed to
rigorously engage with externalist history (p. 6). The reader is nonetheless
left wondering what history was excluded that might have added complexity
to and created uncertainty regarding the requirements of self-government
and their relationship to freedom of speech. Post’s history is not a thorough
one. His contribution is instead to open up a new frame for thinking about
the history of self-government that he or other scholars can elaborate upon
in future work.
A more sustained historical inquiry might look more closely at how the
American people have conceived the meaning of freedom of speech and self-
government, and the relationship between the two, from the framing period
onward. Such an inquiry might also try to identify how popular constitu-
tional convictions and social-movement claims about the meaning and form
of this relationship evolved over time. These historical accounts might seek
evidence from popular deliberation and from dialogue between the people
and the Court about how First Amendment values should be prioritized and
the reasons for such prioritization. Since a hierarchy of First Amendment
values is central to Post’s constitutional framework, evidence that the people
prioritized certain values in their conceptualization of the First Amendment
would be helpful. These are just some of the opportunities for future explo-
ration suggested by Post’s historical account.
II. The Constitutional Framework for
Campaign Finance Regulations
In the second lecture, “Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amend-
ment,” Post constructs from “our fundamental constitutional commitment
to self-governance” a First Amendment constitutional framework applicable
to campaign finance cases (p. 7). In articulating the framework, Post starts
31. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611,
621 (1999) (describing original meaning as focused on ascertaining the meaning “that a rea-
sonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of
its enactment”).
32. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Con-
stitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 27, 28 (2005) (identifying past
social movements that “profoundly shaped judicial interpretations of the American Constitu-
tion”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 379–80 (2007) (describing the importance of the “constitu-
tional ideals” of the people to judicially elaborated constitutional meaning).
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in the direction of a First Amendment imperialist. He broadly defines First
Amendment rights in the campaign finance realm and argues that state in-
terests in democratic integrity are incompatible with First Amendment val-
ues (pp. 45–51). Post then shifts away from First Amendment imperialism
by offering the protection of electoral integrity as a compelling basis for state
regulation of campaign finance (p. 60). In this Part, I describe Post’s frame-
work and explain how he applies it to Citizens United.
A. Post as a First Amendment Imperialist
In several respects, Post approaches the question of the meaning of the
First Amendment in the campaign finance context from the perspective of a
First Amendment imperialist. He begins by acknowledging the potentially
unlimited reach of the First Amendment. Post explains that “[h]uman inter-
action everywhere characteristically occurs through the medium of commu-
nication. . . . On their face, therefore, First Amendment rights apply to
almost all human transactions” (p. 45). The First Amendment can thus pro-
vide a basis for “constitutionaliz[ing] vast stretches of social life” (p. 45).
Rather than retreat from this broad conception of speech, Post appears to
embrace it in his assessment of why money is speech (pp. 45–46).
Several scholars suggest that money should be treated as speech because
it facilitates speech—and Post agrees with this assessment, but only as a
secondary matter. As a primary matter, Post explains that the First Amend-
ment limits the regulation of money because “the First Amendment re-
strains government action that is enacted for constitutionally improper
purposes” (p. 46). He offers, as a hypothetical, a case in which the state
adopts expenditure bans that apply to Democrats and not Republicans (p.
45). He explains that the law would raise “serious First Amendment ques-
tion[s] . . . because the legislation would naturally arouse suspicion that it is
motivated by the improper purpose of distorting the free formation of pub-
lic opinion” (pp. 45–46).
That assessment certainly seems right. But Post’s account of the im-
proper purpose test lacks the nuance necessary to differentiate between im-
permissible regulations of expenditures as speech and permissible
regulations of expenditures as non-speech under the First Amendment.
Consider the more difficult hypothetical involving a shareholder-protection
statute that bans corporate expenditures on political activities.33 Should the
ban be subject to First Amendment scrutiny as a regulation of speech? While
Post’s improper purpose test is not fully fleshed out in the book, one can
surmise from his broad acceptance of campaign expenditures as speech that
he would consider such a ban on expenditures to be a regulation of speech.
But John Hart Ely provided a more robust tool for addressing whether a
33. A bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 2010 required “shareholder au-
thorization before a public company may make certain political expenditures, and for other
purposes.” H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010).
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regulation was enacted for a constitutionally improper purpose that pro-
vides an appropriate limit on Post’s expansive understanding of the reach of
the First Amendment. For Ely, the crucial issue is whether
the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact
that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly out of the way
people can be expected to react to his message, or rather would arise even
if the defendant’s conduct had no communicative significance whatever.34
It is the causal connection between the interests the state asserts and the
communicative content of the speech that provides a basis for making sense
of seemingly inconsistent Supreme Court decisions.35 In cases decided in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court extended First Amendment protection
to children wearing armbands in school as a form of protest during the
Vietnam War,36 and the Court similarly protected an individual wearing a
jacket with the message “Fuck the Draft” on its back.37 But the Court refused
to extend such protections to individuals burning draft cards during a pro-
test.38 Ely argues that what distinguishes the cases is the nature of the harm
the state seeks to avert. In the two cases extending First Amendment protec-
tion to wearing an armband and to wearing a jacket with an expletive on it,
the state’s regulation of each act arose out of fear about the message’s effect
on the audience.39 In the case denying First Amendment protection to the
burning of draft cards, by contrast, the Court determined that the state in-
terest in preserving selective service records was unrelated to the communi-
cative content associated with the act.40
Is the corporate expenditure ban more analogous to banning armbands
and a profane jacket or to prohibiting the burning of a draft card? It depends
on the harm that the state seeks to avert with the regulation. The protection
of the interests of corporate shareholders is a possible justification for the
hypothetical corporate expenditure ban. The state could determine that the
fiduciary duties of a corporate director require that any money spent from
the corporate treasury advance the financial interests of the corporation and
that campaign expenditures are not consistent with that goal. This justifica-
tion for banning corporate expenditures, like the justification for prohibiting
34. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1497 (1975).
35. Id.
36. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (A group of
children “publicize[d] their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a
truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting”).
37. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (“The defendant testified that he wore
the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of informing the public of the
depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.” (quoting People v. Cohen, 81
Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Ct. App. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
38. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (“O’Brien stated to FBI agents that
he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs . . . .”).
39. Ely, supra note 34, at 1498.
40. Id.
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the burning of draft cards, is at least arguably unrelated to the communica-
tive content of the expenditure. Viewed in this light, the corporate expendi-
ture ban does not appear to have been enacted with a constitutionally
improper purpose. A case can therefore be made for not treating certain
expenditure bans as regulations of speech subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.
But if expenditures are always considered speech, the question becomes
how the First Amendment should apply. The First Amendment can have an
impressive reach, but little bite, if other interests trump it in those far-reach-
ing domains. As in his determination of the First Amendment’s reach, Post
approaches the question of how the amendment should apply very much
from the vantage point of a First Amendment imperialist. He evaluates the
three main state interests employed to justify campaign finance laws—pro-
moting equality, preventing distortion, and curbing corruption—according
to whether they are consistent with the First Amendment values of discur-
sive democracy and democratic legitimation (p. 47).
In advancing these interests, state actors seek to redress variations of the
concern that certain individuals or entities unfairly influence the political
process, or are perceived to do so, through their campaign contributions and
expenditures. Post argues that these state interests are incompatible with dis-
cursive democracy (p. 47). Discursive democracy, he explains, involves com-
municative processes of public-opinion formation “that are incompatible
with decision making” (p. 49). Because there is no decision and no outcome
from the process of public-opinion formation, no person’s speech influence
can ever be known (p. 54). Rather than equal influence over outcomes, the
individual right to participate in public-opinion formation serves as the core
component in a discursive democracy (p. 49). Through this participation, a
process of democratic legitimation can occur in which “persons believe that
government is potentially responsive to their views” (p. 49). The function of
the First Amendment is “to guarantee that each person is equally entitled to
the possibility of democratic legitimation” (p. 49). This function requires
that individuals be given the meaningful opportunity to participate in pub-
lic-opinion formation “in a manner of their choosing” (p. 50). Campaign
finance regulations impede democratic legitimation insofar as they limit the
opportunity for meaningful participation in their quest to protect against
unfair influence (p. 51).
A central premise of Post’s theory of discursive democracy seems ques-
tionable, however: that no person’s speech influence can ever be known. If
that is indeed the case, the argument that campaign finance regulations pro-
tect against unfair influence loses a great deal of its force. But there is much
to suggest that, even if we assume that public opinion serves as the conduit
through which speech influences outcomes, the sources of influence on pub-
lic opinion can be known and directly connected to particular outcomes.
Views become associated with entities, groups, and associations during the
process of public-opinion formation. Corporations advocate for tax breaks
or favorable regulations; civil rights groups promote aggressive racial-equal-
ity measures; and unions advance messages favoring greater protection for
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workers. Aside from its speech, each entity, group, and association will also
be active in favoring the candidates that support its views through get-out-
the-vote campaigns, sponsorships of candidate appearances, and other ac-
tions. While individuals may also share those views and engage in speech
advancing a particular message, it is often the organized groups that act as a
major force in politics, mobilizing diffuse and sometimes politically disinter-
ested members to advocate for particular causes.41
To the extent that decisionmakers hear these messages when learning of
public opinion and this public opinion ultimately influences their decisions,
the people will likely attribute the message and its effect on the ultimate
decision to the organized catalysts. In addition, as a means of demonstrating
political clout, these organized catalysts will often claim credit for the mes-
sage and the outcome.42 The communicative processes of public-opinion
formation are, therefore, not always entirely impersonal or invisible; in some
cases, they are very much personalized and attributable to particular sources.
If that is the case, we may be concerned about the influence of speech on
decisionmaking even when the speech is channeled through the ongoing
process of public-opinion formation. And we may value regulations of
speech in the discursive space to ensure greater equality of influence in the
decisionmaking process, or, at the very least, we may value regulations that
limit the degree of unfair influence in the decisionmaking process.
Post contends, however, that discursive democracy is separate from rep-
resentative government (p. 59). Whereas discursive democracy involves the
ongoing process of public-opinion formation divorced from actual deci-
sions, representative government “requires constant and recurring episodes
of decision making” (p. 59). In discursive democracy, the people are invisi-
ble, while in representative government “the people must become visible so
that their will can be represented” (p. 59). Given these differences between
discursive democracy and representative government, concerns about unfair
influence that are incompatible with the former are relevant to the latter. It
is through this distinction between discursive democracy and representative
government that Post begins to build a path of resistance to First Amend-
ment imperialism. That path relies heavily on the argument that the integ-
rity of elections (within the realm of representative government) must be
protected to advance the values surrounding the formation of public opin-
ion (within the realm of discursive democracy) (p. 60).
41. Public choice theory suggests that smaller groups are able to overcome collective-
action problems to organize and engage in concerted activity to secure favorable laws through
lobbying and through campaign contributions and expenditures. See Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 9–36 (1965);
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. Econ. J. 224, 231–32
(1967) (discussing the rent-seeking behavior of particular interest groups).
42. See Christopher Hood, The Blame Game, Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Pres-
ervation in Government 9 (2011) (describing how politicians, organizational leaders, and
government employees seek credit “to increase their chances of re-election, reappointment,
promotion, and favorable repute during or even after their lifetimes”).
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B. Post’s Path of Resistance to First Amendment Imperialism
In constructing a path for resisting First Amendment imperialism, Post
starts by explaining that discursive democracy ultimately depends on elec-
tions, the principal tool used to secure representative government. “Elections
underwrite discursive democracy by focusing and prompting public opin-
ion” (p. 59). People engage in the process of public-opinion formation be-
cause they ultimately know that public opinion can influence
decisionmaking through elections (p. 60). In an effective democracy, elec-
tions select representatives who are responsive to public opinion, and this
inspires the continuing process of public-opinion formation after elections.
If elections do not function to select representatives responsive to public
opinion, or if they are not perceived by the people as functioning in this
way, “the link between public discourse and self-government is broken” (p.
60). This breakdown in the connection between communication and self-
government in turn undermines democratic legitimation.
What Post terms electoral integrity therefore serves as an essential pre-
condition of First Amendment rights and the discursive democracy values
that underlie them (p. 60). Elections must be structured so that they “select
for persons who possess the ‘communion of interests and sympathy of senti-
ments’ to remain responsive to public opinion.”43 Electoral integrity refers to
the condition in which elections “have the property of choosing candidates
whom the people trust to possess this sympathy and connection” (p. 60).
Electoral integrity thus “presupposes . . . public trust in the responsiveness
of representatives to public opinion” (p. 61).
In recognizing electoral integrity as an essential precondition to First
Amendment rights, Post diverges from the Supreme Court’s recent First
Amendment imperialist jurisprudence. In Post’s framework, unlike in the
Court’s jurisprudence, First Amendment values do not simply trump state
interests. Instead, the state interests in avoiding unfair influence and the per-
ception of such influence that are in tension with First Amendment rights
are also essential to electoral integrity—a precondition for those same rights
(pp. 62, 65–66). If the people believe that representatives are unfairly influ-
enced by personal and corporate wealth, the people will lack “public confi-
dence that elections are structured to produce officials who are attentive to
public opinion” (p. 62). And ultimately, “Americans cannot maintain the
blessings of self-government unless they believe that elections produce rep-
resentatives who are responsive to public opinion” (p. 63). Campaign fi-
nance regulations should therefore be understood as “seeking to ameliorate
the widespread perception that elected representatives are responsive to per-
sonal and corporate wealth, but not to public opinion” (p. 62). Or, in other
words, campaign finance regulations should be understood as efforts to pre-
serve electoral integrity—and thus to preserve the First Amendment itself.
43. P. 60 (quoting Jack Dennis & Diana Owen, Popular Satisfaction with the Party System
and Representative Democracy in the United States, 22 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 399, 401 (2001)).
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Post acknowledges that the Court in its recent First Amendment juris-
prudence has not entirely ignored concerns about electoral integrity. The
majority in cases like Citizens United has recognized that the state interest in
protecting against quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such cor-
ruption is compelling because of the threat corruption poses to electoral
integrity.44 The problem, according to Post, is that the Court has treated the
existence of such corruption as “a question of law rather than of social fact”
(p. 64). Instead of examining the evidence of corruption that legislative bod-
ies have collected, the Court has simply denied corruption’s existence (pp.
63–64). Post points to the decision invalidating Montana’s restriction on
corporate independent expenditures as a prime example.45 In that case, the
Montana Supreme Court upheld the law on the basis of extensive legislative
findings about the corruption arising from corporate campaign expendi-
tures.46 The court considered this evidence sufficient to justify the corporate
campaign expenditure ban.47 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, however.48
Without accounting for any of the state’s evidence of corruption, the Court
simply held that Citizens United governed the case.49 By invalidating the
Montana law without evaluating the evidence, the Court indicated that
claims of corruption and the appearance of corruption would be treated as a
matter of law rather than social fact (p. 64).
Post explains that electoral integrity should not be evaluated in this way.
Since “[e]lectoral integrity depends upon how Americans believe elections
actually work,” the facts about the relationship between campaign restric-
tions and electoral integrity should be evaluated as part of the constitutional
determination (p. 64). And legislatures should have the authority to regulate
campaign speech to the extent that it poses an “actual threat[ ] to electoral
integrity” (p. 66).
As a second step in the path of resistance to First Amendment imperial-
ism, Post argues that values advanced by the First Amendment should differ
on the basis of the speaker’s identity. The Court in Citizens United deter-
mined that discrimination based on speaker identity is impermissible under
the First Amendment.50 Corporations, the Court explained, have the same
right to speak as individuals irrespective of their capacity to distort the polit-
ical process through campaign expenditures made with the wealth they have
amassed in the economic marketplace.51 Post disagrees. He argues that the
44. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
45. P. 64 (discussing Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per
curiam)).
46. W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 10–11 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 6, 13.
48. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
49. Id.
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
51. Id. at 350.
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First Amendment rights of corporations are distinct from those of individu-
als because, as artificial entities, “[corporations] cannot experience the value
of democratic legitimation” (p. 69). As a consequence, they do “not possess
an equal right to participate in public discourse” (p. 69).
Corporations can, however, “serve as a proxy for the First Amendment
rights of natural persons” (p. 69). They can “assert the rights of persons who
make up the corporation, or . . . assert the rights of persons who are stran-
gers to the corporation” (p. 69). When corporations function in this way,
they should be treated as expressive associations, and their speech should be
classified as part of public discourse entitled to the same speech protections
granted to individuals’ speech (pp. 69–70). But to the extent that corpora-
tions do not operate as expressive associations, their speech advances the
derivative First Amendment value of informing the audience (pp. 71–72).
“Th[is] derivative right of an ordinary commercial corporation to contribute
to informed decision making does not involve the ‘supremely precious’ value
of democratic legitimation” (p. 73). Ordinary corporations’ First Amend-
ment right to speak therefore extends only to the point at which “such infor-
mation . . . may be useful to natural persons who seek to participate in
public discourse” (p. 74). “[I]f the speech of an ordinary commercial corpo-
ration fails to inform public decision making, the speech may be regulated”
(p. 74).
Post draws on Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory to identify when
the speech of ordinary corporations may be regulated. Meiklejohn viewed
the primary purpose of freedom of speech as advancing the marketplace of
ideas, and he emphasized the rights of listeners to be informed of ideas.52
Meiklejohn argued that, if the goal “is to allow ‘all facts and interests rele-
vant to the problem [to] be fully and fairly presented,’ we must adopt proce-
dures that enable ‘facts and interests’ to be presented ‘in such a way that all
the alternative lines of action can be wisely measured in relation to one
another.’”53 The function of such procedures is not to ensure that everyone
can speak but rather “that everything worth saying shall be said.”54
This distinction on the basis of the speaker’s identity leads to a third
step on the path of resistance to the Court’s First Amendment imperialism.
At this step, Post advocates for a broader managerial domain of elections in
which campaign speech can be regulated (p. 79). In domains where speech is
valued for the information it provides to the decisionmaker, Post points out
that procedures must be established that discriminate on the basis of the
speaker’s identity (pp. 77, 79). For example, in legislatures, courts, prisons,
and schools, procedural rules are often established that “discriminate among
speakers based upon whether they are ‘in order’ or ‘out of order’; whether
they intend to speak about relevant or irrelevant matters; whether they are
52. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government
82–89 (1948).
53. P. 76 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 26 (1965)).
54. P. 76–77 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 26 (1965)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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disruptive or orderly; whether they are repetitive or original; and so on” (p.
77). These procedures for managing speech allow the institutions to perform
their functions (pp. 80–81). Procedures that provide teachers with the ca-
pacity to manage student speech, judges to manage lawyer and witness
speech, or correctional officers to manage prisoner speech allow these insti-
tutional actors to perform their respective functions of educating students,
adjudicating cases, and maintaining order. Post refers to these institutions as
“managerial domains [in which] speech may be regulated in order to achieve
the instrumental goals of the domain” (p. 81). These managerial domains
should be considered distinct from public discourse where “speech must be
kept free in order democratically to determine what those goals should be”
(p. 81).
Elections, Post suggests, are managerial domains analogous to schools,
courtrooms, and prisons.55 Procedures to manage speech must be estab-
lished within the election domain to achieve the instrumental goal of electo-
ral integrity (p. 82). This means that, when an ordinary corporation’s speech
undermines electoral integrity, a state must be able to establish procedures
that discriminate against that corporation, even when its speech is valued
because of the information it provides (pp. 84–86).
As Post acknowledges, this account of managerial domains poses a chal-
lenge: it is difficult to identify the end of the managerial domain (where
speech can be regulated) and the beginning of public discourse (where it
cannot) (p. 83). Separating the managerial domain from public discourse is
even harder for an amorphous domain like elections compared to domains
that reside in physical institutions, such as courts, schools, and prisons. For
example, Congress in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act attempted to
draw a line separating speech in the election domain from speech in public
discourse.56 This line focused on the words used in the advertisement, as well
as the timing and distribution of the advertisement. The Court in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life rejected Congress’s line; instead, it narrowed the
regulable election domain by establishing a presumption that advertisements
are in public discourse rather than in the election domain unless there is
clear evidence to the contrary.57
55. P. 81. Other scholars advocate analogous arguments in favor of managerial domains
in which speech is subject to greater regulations. Professor Schauer advanced the case for an
institutional First Amendment more than twenty years ago. He argued that “First Amendment
doctrine [should be] subdivided along institutional lines [so that it] would be better poised
not only to capture important institutional differences, but also to recognize the potentially
distinct First Amendment status that the arts, universities, libraries, and journalism . . . pos-
sess.” Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev.
84, 118 (1998) (footnote omitted). Schauer and Professor Pildes later advocated for the demar-
cation of an election domain in which different First Amendment principles would apply.
Schauer & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1805–07.
56. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155 § 201(a), 116 Stat.
81, 88–90 (2002) (codified in pertinent part at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012)).
57. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).
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Post rejects both Congress’s and the Court’s approaches. For him, “The
boundaries of the managerial domain associated with an election should be
determined by the requirements of achieving” electoral integrity and the
promotion of informed decisionmaking (p. 86). The question of whether
corporate speech undermines these objectives “can be determined only on
the basis of a working knowledge of the material facts” and not by “abstract
doctrinal rules” (p. 86). If material facts indicate that corporate speech un-
dermines electoral integrity or fails to promote informed decisionmaking,
such speech operates within the managerial domain of elections (p. 86).
C. Applying Post’s Framework to Citizens United
Post illustrates his path of resistance to the Court’s First Amendment
imperialism through examining how the Court deviated from that path. He
identifies five ways in which Citizens United departed from the constitu-
tional framework that he advances.
First, the Court did not properly address the concern with electoral in-
tegrity (p. 63). Rather than merely being a compelling interest to be bal-
anced against First Amendment rights, Post argues, electoral integrity should
have been treated as a fundamental precondition for such rights (pp. 64, 86).
Second, the Court failed to evaluate properly the relationship between
campaign expenditures and electoral integrity. Instead of treating the ques-
tion of whether the regulation undermined electoral integrity as one of law,
the Court should have addressed it as an issue of social fact and examined
actual evidence to ascertain the speech’s effect (pp. 63–64, 86).
Third, the Court erred in its application of strict scrutiny to the statu-
tory prohibition on independent corporate expenditures (p. 87). Since cor-
porations are not natural persons, they do not engage in the democratic-
legitimating communicative processes in public discourse (pp. 69, 71). Their
speech, therefore, “merely provide[s] constitutionally valuable information
to the public” (p. 87). Since this speech advances a derivative First Amend-
ment value, the Court should have given it less constitutional protection
than speech by natural persons or corporate expressive associations (pp.
71–72).
Fourth, the Court failed to consider the possibility that the speech of
ordinary corporations might be part of the managerial domain of elections,
which Congress should have greater authority to regulate in order to main-
tain electoral integrity (p. 87). The Court should have defined this domain
according to whether the corporate speech undermines electoral integrity (p.
87).
Fifth, assuming that the statutory prohibition “actually produces a less
informed public,” the Court should have balanced the loss of information
“against whatever gains in electoral integrity [the statute] . . . promote[s]”
and assessed the constitutionality of the law on that basis (p. 87). The con-
clusion from Post’s application of his framework to Citizens United is that a
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lesser form of scrutiny than strict scrutiny should have applied to the cam-
paign finance regulation, with empirically based balancing tests determining
the outcome (pp. 87, 91–94).
D. Extending the Path of Resistance Beyond Citizens United
If Post had simply criticized the Court’s doctrine as applied to corporate
expenditures and offered a doctrinal framework providing less constitu-
tional protection for such expenditures, his theory would have been an im-
portant, but limited, intervention into the Court’s First Amendment
imperialism. It would have been limited because Post’s constitutional frame-
work does not seem to constrain the capacity of corporations to spend
money from segregated funds in the form of political action committees
(“PACs”). Nor does it constrain the ability of wealthy individuals to spend as
much of their own money as they choose to support a campaign indepen-
dently. Given the strong case under Post’s framework for PACs to be treated
as expressive associations, their speech, along with the speech of wealthy
individuals, would likely be construed as advancing the more precious First
Amendment value of democratic legitimation, which Post sees as entitled to
virtually categorical First Amendment protection (pp. 69, 73–76).
Yet this conclusion would be concerning. The speech of PACs and
wealthy corporate owners can do as much to undermine electoral integrity
as corporate spending from general-treasury funds. In assessing whether to
trust that the electoral process will yield representatives responsive to the
people, the people are unlikely to distinguish between the effects of expendi-
tures from Chevron or Chevron PAC. Similarly, Sheldon Adelson’s $20 mil-
lion expenditure through a super PAC supporting Newt Gingrich in the
2012 Republican presidential primary, or the Koch brothers’ expenditure of
hundreds of millions of dollars to favor Republican candidates in state and
federal elections,58 is just as likely to create the perception that the chain of
communications between representatives and constituents is broken as
would huge campaign expenditures by Bank of America.
Post recognizes this tension between the First Amendment values of
democratic legitimation—which demands that individuals and expressive
associations be able to spend money in whatever manner they choose—and
that of electoral integrity. He explains that this tension raises a deep paradox
(p. 91). “If we prevent government control over independent expenditures,
we diminish the very democratic legitimation that uncontrolled indepen-
dent expenditures are meant to enable. But . . . if we prohibit persons from
expressing themselves in the manner they believe best, we also circumscribe
the possibility of democratic legitimation” (p. 91). Post’s response to this
deep paradox parallels other prescriptions in his constitutional framework.
58. Nicholas Confessore, Campaign Aid Is Now Surging into 8 Figures, N.Y. Times, June
14, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/us/politics/sheldon-adelson-
sets-new-standard-as-campaign-aid-surges-into-8-figures.html; Editorial, The Koch Party, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 2014, at SR14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/opinion/sun
day/the-koch-party.html.
936 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:917
Courts, he argues, should engage in a fact-based judgment to ascertain
“whether the dangers to electoral integrity of government inaction outweigh
the risks to democratic legitimation of potential government regulation” (p.
91). He acknowledges that this will be a “difficult, fraught, empirically based
calculus,” but he believes that courts are up to the task (p. 91).
Post concludes with a broad critique of the Court that predicts the end
of its First Amendment empire. He explains that the Court, “[b]arricaded
behind formidable formal First Amendment rules like strict scrutiny or an-
tidiscrimination, . . . has failed to appreciate, much less to consider, the true
First Amendment stakes that underlie contemporary campaign finance legis-
lation” (p. 94). This misguided jurisprudence “about matters of such funda-
mental importance to American politics is a frightful thing” (p. 94). But at
the end of the day, “self-government will not be denied. It does not require a
prophet to foresee a constitutional impasse of potentially tragic proportions”
(p. 94).
Post may be right that the irrepressible desire of the American people
for self-government could eventually end the Court’s First Amendment im-
perialist adventure. But Post’s path of resistance must confront a critical
doctrinal hurdle before his enterprise can succeed. In the next Part, I argue
that the Supreme Court’s chilling effect doctrine poses a barrier to its ac-
cepting Post’s program. I then discuss how administrative agencies can help
address some of the Court’s main concerns about these chilling effects.
III. The Obstacle: Chilling Effects
Post’s constitutional framework makes Herculean demands on the judi-
ciary. He asks that courts engage in several difficult fact-based judgments in
adjudicating First Amendment challenges to campaign expenditure restric-
tions. These empirical judgments include whether the corporation is an or-
dinary corporation or an expressive association; the effect of the corporate
speech on electoral integrity; the effect of the campaign finance regulation
on the flow of information; whether speech was in the electoral domain or
in public discourse; and, most importantly, whether the dangers to electoral
integrity of governmental inaction outweigh the risks to democratic legiti-
mation of potential governmental regulation (pp. 70–92). These judgments
are certainly not impossible. They might not even be outside the norm of
what courts do in a variety of other legal contexts. The problem, however, is
that Post’s demand that courts make these empirical judgments is in tension
with the Supreme Court’s recent chilling effect doctrine.
While the chilling effect doctrine has been part of the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence for over half a century,59 in recent campaign fi-
nance cases it has morphed into a new form. Chilling effect doctrine has
traditionally been concerned with overbroad and vague laws that regulate
59. See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 Vand. L.
Rev. 1473, 1485–89 (2013) (identifying the origin of the chilling effect doctrine in First
Amendment cases decided in the 1950s).
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First Amendment protected and unprotected speech.60 A chilling effect on
speech occurs when individuals “seeking to engage in activity protected by
the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regu-
lation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”61 This deterrence
arises from an individual’s uncertainty about whether the law applies to her
speech and from her fear of being prosecuted for violating the law.62 Under
the traditional chilling effect doctrine, a party subject to prosecution for
violating a law can, in a petition for injunctive or declaratory relief, prove
that the law would be unconstitutional as applied to other people.63 This
exception to the ordinary standing requirements is designed to combat the
deterrent effect that overbroad and vague regulations can have on protected
speech.64 When courts adjudicate these suits and evaluate a law’s constitu-
tionality as applied to third parties, they sometimes employ the type of con-
text-based balancing test that Post suggests for his constitutional
framework.65
In its more recent campaign finance cases, the Court has broadened the
contours of the conventional chilling effect doctrine. It has determined that
a chilling effect arises simply from the requirement that a litigant prove that
a law violates the First Amendment as applied. According to this modified
doctrine, a speaker’s need to obtain a lawyer to determine whether speech is
constitutionally protected results in a chilling effect because not all speakers
are willing to incur the costs of legal representation.66 Vagueness and over-
breadth in legislation, then, are no longer the only problems with speech
regulations. Blurry, context-based constitutional standards created by the ju-
diciary also raise chilling concerns if they leave the speaker unable to deter-
mine whether his speech is protected without the assistance of a lawyer.
The Court’s campaign finance decisions illustrate the conservative jus-
tices’ deep concern about chilling effects, a concern that drives the Court’s
First Amendment imperialism. The Court has consistently invoked these po-
tential chilling effects to justify rejecting blurry standards and empirical
judgments in favor of sharper, categorical rules that privilege speech rights.
For example, in Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court explained that a First
60. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1633,
1652–53 (2013) (examining the relationship between the chilling effect and vague or over-
broad statutes).
61. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Ef-
fect”, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
62. See id. at 694 (describing, as the source of the chilling effect on speech, legal uncer-
tainty arising from the possibility of error in the legal process combined with the fear of
punishment).
63. Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 808, 820 (1969).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 822 (“[W]hen the issue is whether the law is unconstitutional, the fact that
it incidentally deters speech or association has no absolute effect. Rather the Court continues
to employ a balancing test.”).
66. Kendrick, supra note 60, at 1653–54 (describing, as a source of chilling effect, a
speaker’s need to “obtain[ ] legal advice prior to speaking”).
938 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:917
Amendment standard “must entail minimal if any discovery, to allow parties
to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech through the threat of bur-
densome litigation. . . . And it must eschew ‘the open-ended rough-and-
tumble of factors,’ which ‘invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a
virtually inevitable appeal.’”67 Later, in Citizens United, the Court declined
“to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case determina-
tions to verify whether political speech is banned” because such an approach
could have a chilling effect on political speech.68
From the chilling effect doctrine’s perspective, the problem with Post’s
proposed constitutional framework is that he assigns difficult empirical
judgments to courts in a pluralist judiciary in which judges are likely to
evaluate evidence differently and therefore reach different conclusions even
on the same or similar sets of facts. Uncertainty about how courts will evalu-
ate laws necessarily increases when courts are forced to make empirical judg-
ments. And the more numerous and difficult these judgments are, the
greater the degree of legal uncertainty.
Under Post’s constitutional framework, it is easy to imagine a speaker
feeling uncertain about whether a court will decide that her corporation is
an ordinary corporation or an expressive association. If the court deems the
speaker a corporation, the speaker will not know for certain whether the
court will find that the speech is within the managerial domain of elections
or public discourse. If the speech is considered to be in the domain of elec-
tions, the speaker will not know how the court will assess the speech’s effect
on electoral integrity or how it will decide whether the speech adds to the
flow of information. If the speaker is considered an individual or expressive
association acting in the managerial domain of elections, the speaker will be
mostly in the dark about how the court will weigh the dangers to electoral
integrity of governmental inaction against the risk to democratic legitima-
tion of potential governmental regulation. Even if some predictions about
the court’s empirical judgments can be made on the basis of legal research
into past decisions, the Supreme Court deems troubling from a First
Amendment perspective the requirement that speakers consult lawyers
before they speak.
One does not need to be a First Amendment imperialist to recognize the
value of ensuring that constitutional speech is not deterred. This desire to
avoid deterrence would seem to be applicable both to speech that serves the
First Amendment value of democratic legitimation and to speech that serves
the First Amendment value of informing the public.
But it cannot be the case that fact-based judgments are verboten under
the First Amendment. As troubling as the concern about chilling speech may
be, exclusively relying on formal categorical First Amendment rules also
seems problematic. Insofar as categorical First Amendment rules favor
67. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513
U.S. 527, 547 (1995)).
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
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speech, countervailing state interests—such as the integrity of the demo-
cratic process—will be undermined. We need not agree with Post’s argu-
ment that electoral integrity is a precondition to First Amendment rights to
recognize that protecting speech used to engage in quid pro quo corruption
will destroy our democracy. The questions of when speech corrupts and
whose speech corrupts will often require assessing contexts and balancing
factors. As Post suggests, these are questions of fact, not of law.
Assuming the validity of the new chilling effect doctrine, can a context-
based doctrinal inquiry—an inquiry necessary to avoid an imperialist First
Amendment—emerge given the Court’s concern about the chilling effects of
such inquiries? One way of resolving this dilemma would be by looking to
agencies rather than courts as key institutional actors in assessing the facts
underlying the First Amendment inquiry. The Federal Elections Commis-
sion (“FEC”), for example, can use its expertise to make the context-based
judgments necessary under Post’s constitutional framework while avoiding
chilling effects. The agency can do so by providing relatively low-cost advi-
sory determinations about the constitutionality of campaign speech before
the speaker incurs the risk of punishment.69
Post’s constitutional framework does not appear to rely on agencies,
however. Courts are the central institutional actors responsible for making
the empirical judgments that his theory demands. From the perspective of
the new chilling effect doctrine, this singular focus on the courts is problem-
atic. Since federal courts are limited to deciding actual cases or controversies
and are constitutionally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions,70 the
speaker pays the cost of obtaining legal representation and incurs the risk of
punishment when she engages in speech and then seeks judicial relief from
prosecution. Unlike courts, though, agencies can and do issue advisory
opinions about how a law might apply to a particular act before an individ-
ual commits that act. As noted above, the FEC, which is responsible for
enforcing campaign finance laws, issues advisory opinions responding “to
questions regarding the application of Federal campaign finance law to spe-
cific factual situations.”71 This advisory opinion process provides a low-cost
means for speakers to determine the legality of their speech without any risk
of punishment.
Given its ability to issue advisory opinions, the FEC should be charged
with making the fact-based judgments that Post proposes in his constitu-
tional framework. Campaign finance laws are written against the back-
ground of the Constitution. Thus, even if campaign finance law does not
directly address constitutionally relevant distinctions between types of
speakers, questions of electoral integrity, or the managerial domain of elec-
tions, the FEC should be willing to rule on these matters in issuing advisory
69. See Advisory Opinions, Fed. Election Commission, http://saos.fec.gov/saos/searchao
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
70. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 247–48 (1988)
(identifying the origins of the constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions).
71. Advisory Opinions, supra note 69.
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determinations about the permissibility of certain speech acts. The agency
has the authority to make these determinations as a delegate to Congress
enforcing the First Amendment pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.72 In this enforcement role, the FEC should not redefine the
substance of the constitutional principles advanced in the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.73 But the agency should be given leeway to make
its own independent factual assessments about how First Amendment prin-
ciples and standards apply to a particular case.
On the basis of the Court’s past jurisprudence and scholarly theorizing,
First Amendment principles might include protecting speech to promote
democratic legitimation or to inform the electorate, with electoral integrity
considered an essential precondition to First Amendment rights. While leg-
islatures would then have the discretion to adopt statutes that are animated
by constitutional principles, legislatures cannot address specific factual con-
texts with general rules. The FEC can remedy this shortcoming by issuing
advisory opinions with specific guidance on a range of topics, including
whether a particular speech act is considered electioneering communica-
tions; whether a particular corporation falls within the class of ordinary cor-
porations whose speech is subject to greater federal regulation; and whether
the expenditures of wealthy individuals or expressive associations under-
mine electoral integrity.
Of course, speakers can still bring a lawsuit in court challenging a law as
applied to their speech. It is important to recognize, however, that the man-
ner in which courts review an agency determination will prove just as criti-
cal to avoiding chilling effects as issuing the advisory determination in the
first place. Courts should defer to the agency’s judgment so long as it pro-
vides empirical support for the advisory determination. Such empirical sup-
port, which the FEC provides after considering public comments as part of
its advisory-opinion process, includes specific showings of how the determi-
nation advances First Amendment principles. When courts review this evi-
dence, the question should not be whether it proves persuasive—such a
standard would exacerbate the problem of legal uncertainty that creates the
chilling effect. Instead, the question should be whether the agency has pro-
vided adequate evidence in the record about how the statute or regulation
advances the constitutional principle. There will surely remain some residual
legal uncertainty arising from this adequacy determination, but there will be
substantially less uncertainty than that which would result from a height-
ened standard of persuasiveness or from the difficult and fraught empirical
judgments that Post asks courts to make on first impression in his constitu-
tional framework (p. 91).
72. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
73. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“The design of the Amend-
ment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”).
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Concerns about the FEC’s institutional gridlock and dysfunction re-
present one obvious objection to any attempt to use that agency to reconcile
the new chilling effect doctrine with the need for context-based empirical
judgments. The FEC is a bipartisan agency composed of an equal number of
members from each party.74 While this design may have been intended to
ensure more deliberative decisionmaking, it has produced deadlock and de-
lay.75 Unless there is a mechanism in place to break these deadlocks, the
critics might contend, the party seeking advice on the permissibility of a
speech act finds itself back at square one: It can speak, obtain a lawyer, and
defend the speech’s constitutionality in court. Or, it can refrain from speak-
ing altogether. The Supreme Court would probably respond to this dilemma
by establishing categorical rules to provide parties with clearer guidance on
the constitutionality of their speech—rules that would likely come at the
cost of countervailing state interests in electoral integrity. But Professor Nou
offers a way around this institutional deadlock. She argues that courts
should look below the deadlocked commissioners and give some deference
to the expert guidance that agency staffers provide to the commission.76 To
be sure, Nou’s proposal is far from a perfect solution, since courts reviewing
agency staffers’ guidance will evaluate the guidance on the basis of its per-
suasiveness—a lower standard of agency deference that could produce
greater uncertainty for parties trying to assess the permissibility of their
speech. But if the goal is to reduce the legal uncertainty that might otherwise
chill protected speech, some judicial deference to an advisory determination
is certainly better than no deference at all.
For Post’s constitutional framework to have any hope of being embraced
by the Supreme Court’s conservative majority, it must address the obstacle
posed by the Court’s new chilling effect doctrine. This Review offers a po-
tential, though still preliminary, means of overcoming that obstacle, by
highlighting the crucial role that agencies might serve in issuing advisory
opinions about the legality of certain forms of speech.
Conclusion
Citizens Divided is a valuable contribution to the debate about First
Amendment doctrine in the campaign finance realm. Dean Post identifies
an alternative constitutional approach to campaign finance laws, one that
resists the Court’s First Amendment imperialism. It is a path that impor-
tantly integrates concerns about electoral integrity into the assessment of the
meaning of First Amendment rights. And yet from the perspective of the
74. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2012) (establishing a six-member commission and provid-
ing that “[n]o more than 3 members of the Commission . . . may be affiliated with the same
political party”).
75. See Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135, 151 (suggesting
that independent election commissions are “structured to deadlock”).
76. Id. at 160–62.
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current Supreme Court majority, Post’s path would create too much uncer-
tainty in First Amendment doctrine. By adding a new element in his consti-
tutional framework, though—incorporating a distinct decisionmaking body,
agencies, in addition to courts—Post might very well succeed in reconciling
the Court’s First Amendment concerns with the needs of self-government.
